Another day, another multimillion dollar fine for a big bank.

This week's $100 million settlement with JPMorgan Chase by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission is notable for reasons that go beyond the hefty sum -- $100 million – levied against it as further fallout from its now infamous “London Whale” derivatives trades that lost more than $6.2 billion.

To start with, it was a coming-of-age moment for the CFTC. Since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, that agency was greatly elevated in stature and tasked with a growing workload despite operating with only a fraction of the manpower and budget of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The order issued against JPMorgan on Wednesday, the result of a 17-month investigation, further solidifies its position as an increasingly important cop-on-the-beat.

According to the CFTC Order, “by selling a staggering volume of these swaps in a concentrated period, [JPMorgan], acting through its traders, recklessly disregarded the fundamental precept on which market participants rely, that prices are established based on legitimate forces of supply and demand.”

“In Dodd-Frank, Congress provided a powerful new tool enabling the CFTC for the first time to prohibit reckless manipulative conduct,” said David Meister, the CFTC's Director of Enforcement. “The Commission is now better armed than ever to protect the market from traders, like those here, who try to ‘defend' their position by dumping a gargantuan, record-setting, volume of swaps virtually all at once, recklessly ignoring the obvious dangers to legitimate pricing forces.”

Also notable is how the CFTC approached the hot topic of requiring admissions of guilt in enforcement actions. The SEC made headlines not too long ago for the mere suggestion by Chairman Mary Jo White that it will move away from a longstanding practice of not requiring admissions of guilt when a settlement is reached. Past practice, at that agency, was that an entity could cut a check and avoid admitting culpability by the institution or anyone it employs. The CFTC's Order, the first case to charge a violation of the Dodd Frank Act's prohibition against manipulative conduct, had no such caveat. JPMorgan was forced to admit its traders acted recklessly.

The CFTC's actions build upon efforts by other agencies in the U.S., and the Financial Services Authority in the U.K. The charges are related to massive losses blamed in large part on Bruno Iksil, a trader who earned his nickname, “The London Whale,” from the size of the trades he orchestrated at JPMorgan Chase's Chief Investment Office (CIO). A report by a Senate subcommittee found evidence that traders mis-marked trading book to hide losses; disregarded indicators of increasing risk; manipulated risk models; dodged regulatory oversight; and misinformed investors, regulators, and the public about the nature of its risky derivatives trading. The portfolio eventually lost more than $6 billion.

In addition to paying the cash penalty, JPMorgan must continue to implement enhancements to its supervision and control system in connection with swaps trading activity. This includes improved trading and risk management controls.

CFTC Commissioner Scott D. O'Malia dissented from the Order on the grounds that it did not go far enough. He questioned “whether it is in the public interest to settle with JPMorgan on a lesser ‘manipulative device' charge.”

“I am concerned that in a rush to join in on a settlement brokered by other regulators, the Commission may be missing the opportunity to pursue allegations of greater wrongdoing—price manipulation,” he said. “Remarkably, the Order discusses the Commission's broad manipulation authority at length, but still does not conclude whether JPMorgan's aggressive trading strategy resulted in price manipulation. Failure to do so undermines the Commission's integrity and its enforcement powers in favor of taking shortcuts to achieve high-profile settlements.”

CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton, who did support the Order, used it to again further his demand that the CFTC be keep some of the monetary penalties it assesses. To be able to do so, as the SEC does, would require legislative action. “The day before the Oct. 1 government shutdown, the CFTC returned a billion dollars to the Treasury,” he said. “The following day… out went the lights at the CFTC.” Congress, he said, should “approve one single sentence to allow the CFTC use of the types of funds we returned.”